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Fighting Foreclosure: Using Contract Law to  
Enforce the Home Affordable Modification 
Program (HAMP) 
Arsen Sarapinian* 
In 2009, the Secretary of the Treasury and the Obama Administration unveiled the 
Making Home Affordable Program (“MHA”) to slow the foreclosure crisis and stabilize 
the economy. A key component of the MHA is the Home Affordable Modification 
Program (“HAMP”), a seventy-five billion dollar program designed to incentivize loan 
servicers to modify loans for certain qualified borrowers. The Treasury estimated that 
HAMP would permanently modify three to four million mortgages by the end of 2012; 
however, HAMP has failed to meet its objective.  
 
Under HAMP, if a borrower meets certain criteria, she will be placed on a three-month 
trial period plan (“TPP”) where she will pay a lowered mortgage payment equal to 31% 
of her gross monthly income. If the borrower makes this lowered payment for three 
months and meets other requirements, the servicer should extend a permanent 
modification with a reduced monthly payment. As written, however, the provision allows 
servicers to deny permanent modifications even if borrowers successfully meet their 
reduced mortgage payments.  
 
Recently, borrowers began to bring common law breach of contract claims to enforce the 
TPP, arguing that the TPP is a binding contract that requires servicers to grant 
permanent loan modifications. Currently, there is controversy over the validity of the 
TPP-based breach of contract theory and a split amongst the federal courts. This Note 
provides an overview of the HAMP application process, examines the controversy and 
split amongst the federal courts, argues in favor of upholding the theory, and provides 
recommendations for national legislation. 
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Introduction 
The recent U.S. economic collapse triggered the worst recession since 
the Great Depression.1 A significant contributor to the 2007 recession was 
the mortgage foreclosure crisis.2 The numbers are staggering. From 2007 to 
 
 1. See Diana I. Gregg, World Is in Recession in 2009 in Wake of Financial Sector Crisis, BNA 
Banking Rep., Jan. 6, 2009, available at LEXIS, News Library, BNABNK File (citing the World 
Bank’s assessment that the current financial crisis is the “most serious since the 1930s”); Ben S. 
Bernanke, Chairman, Fed. Reserve Bd., Speech at the Council on Foreign Relations (Mar. 10, 2009), 
available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20090310a.htm (“The world is 
suffering through the worst financial crisis since the 1930s . . . .”). 
 2. See Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, The Subprime Virus: Reckless Credit, 
Regulatory Failure and Next Steps (2011) (providing a thorough overview of the foreclosure crisis 
and its effects on the U.S. economy); John Rao & Geoff Walsh, Nat’l Consumer Law Ctr., 
Foreclosing a Dream: State Laws Deprive Homeowners of Basic Protections 8 (2009), available at 
http://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/foreclosure_mortgage/state_laws/foreclosing-dream-report.pdf (“The 
consequences of this foreclosure crisis are enormous, ripping through both Wall Street and Main 
Street.”); Jean Braucher, Humpty Dumpty and the Foreclosure Crisis: Lessons from the Lackluster 
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2011, foreclosures were initiated on 11 million properties.3 In an effort to 
slow the climbing foreclosure rates, President Bush signed into law 
H.R. 1424, the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 (“the 
Act”).4 One goal of the Act was to restore market liquidity and stabilize 
the U.S. economy.5 Section 109 of the Act authorizes the Secretary of the 
Treasury (the “Secretary”) to create and implement a plan to decrease 
the rate of foreclosures. In the spring of 2009, the Secretary and the 
Obama Administration unveiled the Making Home Affordable Program 
(“MHA”).6 
A key component of the MHA is the Home Affordable Modification 
Program (“HAMP”), a program designed to encourage loan servicers7 to 
modify loans for certain qualified borrowers.8 One of the goals of HAMP 
is to reduce the rate of foreclosure by lowering borrowers’ monthly 
mortgage payments to 31% of their monthly gross income.9 HAMP 
 
First Year of the Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP), 52 Ariz. L. Rev. 727, 728–29 
(2010) (“HAMP provides a compelling case study of the complex challenge of mitigating the effects of 
an economic crisis brought on by high-risk financial products.”). 
 3. Lenders began foreclosure proceedings on nearly 1.3 million properties in 2007, 2.3 million in 
2008, and 2.8 million in 2009. RealtyTrac: Year-End Report Shows Record 2.8 Million U.S. Properties with 
Foreclosure Filings in 2009, RealtyTrac (Jan. 14, 2010), http://www.realtytrac.com/content/foreclosure-
market-report/realtytrac-year-end-report-shows-record-28-million-us-properties-with-foreclosure-filings-
in-2009-5489. In 2010, lenders began foreclosure proceedings on a record 2.9 million properties. 
Record 2.9 Million U.S. Properties Receive Foreclosure Filings in 2010 Despite 30-Month Low in 
December, RealtyTrac (Jan. 13, 2011), http://www.realtytrac.com/content/press-releases/record-29-
million-us-properties-receive-foreclosure-filings-in-2010-despite-30-month-low-in-december-6309. In 
2011, 1.8 million properties faced foreclosure. 2011 Year-End Foreclosure Report: Foreclosures on the 
Retreat, RealtyTrac (Jan. 12, 2012), http://www.realtytrac.com/content/news-and-opinion/2011-year-
end-foreclosure-market-report-6984?accnt=13562. 
 4. Pub. L. No. 110-343, 122 Stat. 3765 (2008). 
 5. 12 U.S.C. § 5201 (2008) (“The purposes of this chapter are (1) to immediately provide 
authority and facilities that the Secretary of the Treasury can use to restore liquidity and stability to 
the financial system of the United States; and (2) to ensure that such authority and such facilities are 
used in a manner that (A) protects home values, college funds, retirement accounts, and life savings; 
(B) preserves homeownership and promotes jobs and economic growth; (C) maximizes overall returns 
to the taxpayers of the United States; and (D) provides public accountability for the exercise of such 
authority.”). 
 6. See HAMP Supplemental Directive 09-01: Introduction of the Home Affordable 
Modification Program 1 (2009) [hereinafter HAMP Supplemental Directive]. 
 7. A servicer is a financial institution that collects the borrower’s monthly mortgage payments 
and has responsibility for the management and accounting of the loan. It is possible that the owner of 
a mortgage also services it; however, many loans are owned by groups of investors who hire loan 
servicers to interact with homeowners on their behalf. A servicer primarily profits from late fees 
associated with late mortgage payments. Additionally, servicers, “unlike investors, generally recover 
all their hard costs after a foreclosure, even if the home sells for less than the mortgage loan balance. 
Servicers may even make money from foreclosures through charging borrowers and investors fees that 
are ultimately recouped from the loan pool.” See infra Part II; see also Diane E. Thompson, 
Foreclosing Modifications: How Servicer Incentives Discourage Loan Modifications, 86 Wash. L. Rev. 
755, 765–68 (2011). 
 8. See HAMP Supplemental Directive, supra note 6, at 1. 
 9. Id. at 6 (“The borrower will only qualify for the HAMP if the verified income documentation 
confirms that the monthly mortgage payment ratio prior to the modification is greater than 31 percent. 
The ‘monthly mortgage payment ratio’ is the ratio of the borrower’s current monthly mortgage 
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allocated seventy-five billion dollars worth of incentives to encourage loan 
investors, servicers, and borrowers to work together to modify mortgages.10 
The Treasury estimated that HAMP would permanently modify three to 
four million mortgages by the end of 2012.11 However, after its first year, 
HAMP’s shortfalls came to light as data showed that HAMP produced 
only 230,801 permanent modifications.12 It became apparent that at this 
rate, HAMP would not meet its projected goal.13 According to a recent 
report, “approximately 2.8 million borrowers had their HAMP loan 
modification application denied or their trial [period plan] canceled.”14 
While the intentions of the proposed legislation were noteworthy, loan 
servicers and financial institutions circumvented the program’s provisions 
to protect their own interests. This resulted in a lackluster program that 
incentivized servicers to modify loans but did very little to make those 
modifications permanent.15 As a result, a flurry of litigation ensued.16 
The most controversial provision of HAMP is its three-month Trial 
Period Plan (“TPP”).17 Under HAMP, if a borrower meets certain 
requirements, she will be placed on a TPP where she will pay a lowered 
mortgage payment equal to 31% of her gross monthly income.18 If the 
borrower makes this lowered payment for three months, the servicer 
should extend a permanent modification with a reduced monthly payment. 
As written, however, the provision allows servicers to deny permanent 
modifications even if borrowers successfully meet their reduced mortgage 
payments.19 For example, during the TPP, the servicer may request 
 
payment to the borrower’s monthly gross income (or the borrowers’ combined monthly gross income 
in the case of co-borrowers).”). 
 10. See Braucher, supra note 2, at 729 (stating the cost of the program to be $75 billion and 
examining the disappointing first year of the HAMP program). 
 11. See Cong. Oversight Panel, October Oversight Report: An Assessment of Foreclosure 
Mitigation Efforts After Six Months 38, 43 (2009) [hereinafter October Oversight Report]. 
 12. See Making Home Affordable Program: Servicer Performance Report Through March 
2010, at 2 (2010). 
 13. See October Oversight Report, supra note 11, at 43–71 (discussing the shortfalls of HAMP 
after six months of its inception). 
 14. See U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, GAO-12-296, Foreclosure Mitigation: Agencies 
Could Improve Effectiveness of Federal Efforts with Additional Data Collection and 
Analysis 3 (2012) [hereinafter Foreclosure Mitigation]. 
 15. See generally Thompson, supra note 7 (arguing that HAMP does not require servicers to 
modify loans but offers an incentive structure that is supposed to encourage loan modifications). 
 16. For an overview of HAMP-related lawsuits, see John R. Chiles & Matthew T. Mitchell, HAMP: 
An Overview of the Program and Recent Litigation Trends, 65 Consumer Fin. L. Q. Rep. 194 (2011). 
 17. See Making Home Affordable Program: Handbook for Servicers of Non-GSE Mortgages 
106–10 (version 4.0 2012) (outlining the TPP) [hereinafter HAMP Servicer Handbook]. 
 18. Id. at 93. 
 19. Id. at 110 (“A borrower in a TPP may receive a permanent modification as long as the 
servicer has received all required trial period payments timely and all other required documentation 
from the borrower, including a fully executed Modification Agreement. Servicers should not modify a 
mortgage loan if there is reasonable evidence indicating the borrower submitted information that is 
false or misleading or if the borrower otherwise engaged in fraud in connection with the 
modification.”). 
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additional income documentation to ensure that the borrower is eligible 
for a permanent modification.20 This tedious process and degree of 
discretion allows servicers to deny permanent modifications based on 
incomplete applications and insufficient income.21 Unfortunately, evidence 
of servicer misconduct is well chronicled: Borrowers complain that 
servicers lose their paperwork, make oral and written misrepresentations, 
engage in delay tactics, and fail to follow HAMP standards.22 To date, 
over 770,000 borrowers who entered TPPs were denied permanent 
modifications and had their TPPs cancelled.23 
HAMP’s failures have caused borrowers to seek relief through the 
courts. Nevertheless, many borrowers have trouble surviving the pleading 
stage.24 Recently, borrowers began to bring common law breach of 
contract claims to enforce the TPP. They argue that the TPP is a binding 
contract that the servicer breaches when it refuses to grant a permanent 
loan modification despite borrower compliance.25 Currently, there is 
controversy over the validity of the TPP-based breach of contract theory 
and a split among federal courts.26 Cases are often dismissed on the theory 
that HAMP does not afford a private right of action,27 meaning borrowers 
cannot simply sue to enforce a particular HAMP provision. They reason 
that TPPs do not constitute valid, independent contracts, but are instead 
 
 20. See infra Part II.C. 
 21. See infra notes 22, 64, 106; see also TARP Quarterly Report, infra note 106. 
 22. Office of the Special Inspector Gen. for the Troubled Asset Relief Program, SIG-QR-
11-01, Quarterly Report to Congress 12 (2011) [hereinafter TARP Quarterly Report]. 
 23. According to the most recent HAMP performance report, 770,829 trial modifications have 
been cancelled. Making Home Affordable: Program Performance Report Through August 2012, 
at 3 (2012) [hereinafter August 2012 Performance Report]. 
 24. See infra Part III.A. 
 25. See, e.g., Picini v. Chase Home Fin. LLC, 854 F. Supp. 2d 266, 273 (E.D.N.Y 2012) 
(“Specifically, Plaintiffs claim that Defendants breached the TPP by accepting Plaintiffs’ payments 
under the TPP and then failing to modify Plaintiffs’ loan.”); Bosque v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A, 762 F. 
Supp. 2d 342, 351–52 (D. Mass. 2011) (discussing the plaintiffs’ argument that the TPP is a formed 
contract and that the servicer breached it); Belyea v. Litton Loan Servicing, LLP, No. 10-10931-DJC, 
2011 WL 2884964, at *1 (D. Mass. July 15, 2011) (“Plaintiffs contend that the TPP Agreements 
constitute binding contracts with Litton and that Litton failed to satisfy its contractual obligations.”); 
Durmic v. J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., No. 10-CV-10380-RGS, 2010 WL 4825632, at *1 (D. Mass. 
Nov. 24, 2010) (“The TPP is a Fannie Mae/Freddie Mac ‘Uniform Instrument’ that has the 
appearances of a contract.”). 
 26. See infra Part III. 
 27. See, e.g., Vida v. OneWest Bank, F.S.B., No. 10-987-AC, 2010 WL 5148473, at *3–4 (D. Or. 
Dec. 13, 2010) (explaining that courts agree there is no private right of action under HAMP); Manabat 
v. Sierra Pac. Mortg. Co., No. CV F 10-1018 LJO JLT, 2010 WL 2574161, at *11 (E.D. Cal. June 25, 
2010) (“Congress did not intend to create a private right of action for violation of HAMP against 
lenders that received HAMP funds.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Marks v. Bank of Am., 
N.A., No. 03:10-cv-08039-PHX-JAT, 2010 WL 2572988, at *6 (D. Ariz. June 22, 2010) (“Nowhere in 
the HAMP Guidelines, nor in the EESA, does it expressly provide for a private right of action.”). 
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part of the rubric of HAMP.28 This rationale is partly based on 
constitutional preemption principles.29 
Conversely, other courts disagree with this rationale and allow 
borrowers to assert contract claims to enforce TPPs, reasoning that while 
HAMP does not afford a private right of action, it does not preempt state 
common law.30 This approach is more consistent with American 
jurisprudence, because courts generally allow plaintiffs to assert common 
law claims to enforce federal programs. Thus far, the Seventh Circuit 
Court of Appeals is the only appellate court that has addressed the validity 
of the theory, dismissing the preemption arguments and upholding the 
theory.31 As a result, lower courts are mixed in applying the theory, and the 
result is inconsistent decisions.32 
Part I of this Note provides an overview of the HAMP application 
process, with specific emphasis on the TPP. Part II first discusses the 
recent controversy around the TPP-based breach of contract theory and 
the split among federal courts. Part II then looks to the judicial treatment 
of analogous federal statutes and suggests that courts uphold the validity of 
the breach of contract theory and allow borrowers to attain foreclosure 
relief through the courts. This Note concludes by recommending several 
ideas for national legislation that can help achieve HAMP’s unmet goals. 
I.  The Mortgage Crisis 
Several theories purport to explain the origins of the mortgage crisis. 
While there is disagreement among scholars, the general consensus is that 
subprime lending33 and securitization of mortgages34 were significant 
contributors to the mortgage crisis.35 During the last forty years, 
 
 28. See infra Part III.A–B. 
 29. See infra Part III.A–B. 
 30. See infra Part III.C. 
 31. Wigod v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 673 F.3d 547, 575, 586 (7th Cir. 2012). 
 32. See infra Part III. 
 33. Generally, subprime lending refers to lending loans that are designed for persons with 
blemished or limited credit histories and that carry a higher rate of interest than prime loans to 
compensate for increased credit risk. See Subprime Lending, U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., 
http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/HUD?src=/program_offices/fair_housing_equal_opp/lending/subprime 
(last visited Mar. 15, 2013). Statistics show that minorities are overrepresented in the subprime lending 
market. Id. 
 34. See Thompson, supra note 7, at 763 (“In securitization, thousands of loans are pooled 
together in common ownership. Ownership of the loans is held by a trust. The expected income stream 
from the pooled loans together forms the basis for bonds that are sold to investors. Investors who 
purchase the bonds do not own the loans, but they do own the right to receive payment based on the 
loan payments. Bonds may be issued for different categories of payments, including: interest 
payments, principal payments, late payments, and prepayment penalties. Different groups of bond 
holders—or tranches—may get paid from different pots of money and in different order. The majority 
of all home loans in recent years were securitized.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 35. See generally Engel & McCoy, supra note 2, at 15–19 (discussing how subprime lending, 
securitization, and weak government oversight led to the mortgage crisis); Kurt Eggert, The Great 
Collapse: How Securitization Caused the Subprime Meltdown, 41 Conn. L. Rev. 1257, 1276 (2009) 
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regulations on the mortgage market were loosened to encourage home 
ownership and fuel economic growth.36 For example, Congress eliminated 
interest rate caps on first-lien home mortgages and permitted financial 
products other than fixed-rate loans.37 These new products included 
adjustable rate mortgages38 (loans that start off with a low interest rate but 
are adjustable for the life of the loan), balloon payment loans,39 and 
reverse mortgages.40 Additionally, the emergence of securitization, a 
process that allowed note holders to bundle loans with many others, divide 
them, and sell them to investors who would then sell them on the securities 
market, significantly changed the mortgage market.41 
But increased home ownership came at a heavy price. Eventually, 
when interest rates increased and the U.S. economy faltered, borrowers 
could not afford inflated mortgage payments. Servicers began to issue 
foreclosure threats. At-risk borrowers were unable to refinance into 
more affordable loans and lost equity in their homes. In states that follow 
a judicial foreclosure model,42 lenders sought foreclosures through the 
 
(arguing that securitization was a major cause of the subprime meltdown); Raymond C. Niles, Eighty 
Years in the Making: How Housing Subsidies Caused the Financial Meltdown, 6 J.L. Econ. & Pol’y 165 
(2010) (arguing that housing subsidies significantly contributed to the mortgage crisis); William Poole, 
Causes and Consequences of the Financial Crisis of 2007–2009, 33 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 421, 425 
(2010) (stating that the government encouraged the growth of the subprime mortgage market by 
attempting to increase home ownership); Todd J. Zywicki & Joseph D. Adamson, The Law and 
Economics of Subprime Lending, 80 U. Colo. L. Rev. 1 (2009) (arguing that subprime lending was a 
contributor to the mortgage crisis). 
 36. See Engel & McCoy, supra note 2, at 16. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. A balloon payment is a mortgage that does not fully amortize over the term of the note, thus 
leaving a balance due at maturity. The final payment is called a balloon payment because of its large 
size. John P. Wiedemer, Real Estate Finance 109–10 (8th ed. 2001). 
 40. See Engel & McCoy, supra note 2, at 16. 
 41. See Eggert, supra note 35, at 1259 (“[Securitization allowed] subprime lenders [to] make loans 
and sell them on Wall Street, where investment houses marketed securities backed by pools of 
subprime loans . . . [allowing] subprime lenders [to] quickly unload much of the risk of the subprime 
loans as well as recoup the money lent and relend it to new subprime borrowers.”). Additionally, 
securitization created potential conflicts among the various interests involved, including investors, 
note holders, and servicers. Braucher, supra note 2, at 745–46 (“Not only were servicers’ interests not 
necessarily aligned with those of investors, but there were many potential conflicts among investors 
because of their different interests in securitized mortgage pools, a problem popularly referred to as 
the ‘slicing and dicing’ of home mortgages and potentially involving ‘tranche warfare.’”). 
 42. See John Carney, A Primer on the Foreclosure Crisis, CNBC.com (Oct. 11, 2010), http:// 
www.cnbc.com/id/39617381/A_Primer_On_The_Foreclosure_Crisis (stating that there are twenty-
three “judicial states” that require banks to initiate foreclosures through the courts); see also Cong. 
Oversight Panel, November Oversight Report: Examining the Consequences of Mortgage 
Irregularities for Financial Stability and Foreclosure Mitigation 12 n.17 (2010) (“Twenty-two 
states require judicial oversight of foreclosure proceedings.”). Cf. Rao & Walsh, supra note 2, at 12 
(stating that there are thirty-one non-judicial states, including the District of Columbia, leaving only 
twenty “judicial states”). According to Rao and Walsh, the non-judicial foreclosure states are: 
Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, Arizona, California, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Maryland, Massachusetts, 
Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New 
Mexico, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, 
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courts. In states that do not follow a judicial model, lenders did not need 
to involve the courts and completed foreclosures more swiftly.43 
Borrowers in all states were often unable to attain foreclosure relief 
through the court system.44 As a result, subprime lending, increased 
homeownership, and economic instability led to an unprecedented home 
foreclosure crisis, causing millions of Americans to lose their homes.45 
Lawmakers scrambled to reach effective solutions.46 
II.  The Government’s Response: HAMP 
Since 2009, the government has enacted various programs designed to 
help borrowers avoid foreclosure in response to the crisis—including the 
ambitious HAMP.47 The Treasury estimated that HAMP would modify 
three to four million mortgages by the end of 2012.48 To date, HAMP has 
only produced 1,076,747 permanent modifications,49 and “approximately 
2.8 million borrowers had their HAMP loan modification application 
denied or their [TPP] canceled.”50 Moreover, HAMP does not require 
servicers to grant permanent loan modifications that are optimal to the 
borrower. As a result, permanent loan modifications often leave borrowers 
with a high debt-to-income ratio, contain an adjustable interest rate, do not 
reduce the loan principal, and include a future balloon payment51—leaving 
 
Washington, West Virginia, Wyoming, and the District of Columbia. Id. By implication, the “judicial 
states” would be: Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, 
Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, 
Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Vermont, and Wisconsin. 
 43. See Rao & Walsh, supra note 2, at 3 (“[In non-judicial states], mortgage holders who allege 
that homeowners have fallen behind in their payments can bypass the courts and move directly to take 
away and auction off homes. This denies homeowners due process protection comparable to that given 
many tenants. It also places upon homeowners the heavy burden to get a judge to review the mortgage 
holder’s claims and stop the foreclosure.”). 
 44. See generally Lauren E. Willis, Introduction: Why Didn’t the Courts Stop the Mortgage Crisis?, 
43 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 1195 (2010) (providing an overview of unsuccessful mortgage-related lawsuits). 
 45. See RealtyTrac: Year-End Report Shows Record 2.8 Million U.S. Properties, supra note 3 
(documenting the rate of foreclosures). 
 46. For an account of the government’s response to the mortgage crisis, see generally David 
Wessel, In Fed We Trust (2009) (describing the government’s attempt to prevent an economic crisis). 
 47. Other MHA programs include: Principal Reduction Alternative SM (“PRA”), Second Lien 
Modification Program (“2MP”), FHA Home Affordable Modification Program (“FHA-HAMP”), 
USDA’s Special Loan Servicing, Veteran’s Affairs Home Affordable Modification (“VA-HAMP”), 
Home Affordable Foreclosure Alternatives Program (“HAFA”), Second Lien Modification Program 
for Federal Housing Administration Loans (“FHA-2LP”), Home Affordable Refinance Program 
(HARP), FHA Refinance for Borrowers with Negative Equity (“FHA Short Refinance”), Home 
Affordable Unemployment Program (“UP”), and Housing Finance Agency Innovation Fund for the 
Hardest Hit Housing Markets (“HHF”). See View All Programs, Making Home Affordable, 
http://www.makinghomeaffordable.gov/programs/view-all-programs/Pages/default.aspx (last updated 
June 15, 2012). There are also a host of other non-MHA loan modification programs that may be 
available to borrowers. 
 48. October Oversight Report, supra note 11, at 38. 
 49. See August 2012 Performance Report, supra note 23, at 3. 
 50. See Foreclosure Mitigation, supra note 14, at 2. 
 51. See Braucher, supra note 2, at 764 (discussing the likelihood of a high re-default rate). 
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borrowers at risk for re-default and foreclosure. Even at the outset, the 
Treasury estimated that 40% of the borrowers who received permanent 
loan modifications would re-default within only five years.52 
Part of HAMP’s poor success rate is due to the fact that loan 
servicers, not lenders or investors, have vast discretion in modifying 
loans.53 A servicer is neither a lender nor investor but is often a third-party 
financial institution that is hired by investors to manage and account for 
the loan.54 In other words, a servicer is tasked with interacting with 
borrowers and collecting and managing the borrower’s monthly mortgage 
payments.55 Servicers primarily profit from a monthly servicing fee, which 
is a fixed percentage of the outstanding principal balance,56 but when a 
loan becomes delinquent, the amount and nature of servicing changes.57 
A servicer can profit from assigning late fees to borrowers for making 
late mortgage payments,58 and servicers can also make more money by 
making temporary, unsustainable payment agreements than they can by 
making long-term, sustainable modifications.59 Consequently, servicers 
have a track record of extending TPPs but failing to extend permanent 
modifications.60 Additionally, it is the servicer that decides whether to 
foreclose or modify a loan.61 In some cases, a servicer can make a greater 
profit from initiating foreclosure than from granting a permanent loan 
modification.62 As a result of this structure, servicers often do not modify, 
choose modifications that financially benefit themselves, or initiate 
foreclosure proceedings, harming both homeowners and investors.63 
Legislators, consumer advocates, oversight bodies, and the Treasury 
agree that servicer negligence and misconduct exacerbate HAMP’s poor 
success rate.64 Common problems include loss of borrower paperwork, 
 
 52. See Questions for the Record for U.S. Department of the Treasury Assistant Secretary 
Herbert M. Allison, Jr., Cong. Oversight Panel 3 (2009), available at http://cybercemetery.unt.edu/ 
archive/cop/20110402030313/http://cop.senate.gov/documents/testimony-102209-allison-qfr.pdf. 
 53. See Kurt Eggert, Comment on Michael A. Stegman et al.’s “Preventive Servicing Is Good for 
Business and Affordable Homeownership Policy”: What Prevents Loan Modifications?, 18 Hous. Pol’y 
Debate 279, 287 (2007); Adam J. Levitin & Tara Twomey, Mortgage Servicing, 28 Yale J. on Reg. 1, 
22 (2010) (discussing the structure of the servicing industry); Thompson, supra note 7, at 770. See 
generally Am. Securitization Forum, Discussion Paper on the Impact of Forborne Principal on 
RMBS Transactions 1 (2009), available at http://www.americansecuritization.com/uploadedFiles/ 
ASF_Principal_Forbearance_Paper.pdf (explaining that servicers have vast discretion in determining 
what kinds of modifications to approve). 
 54. See Thompson, supra note 7, at 765. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. at 767. 
 57. Id. at 765. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. at 771–72 (“[S]ervicers can make more money from foreclosing than from modifying . . . .”). 
 63. Id. at 772. 
 64. See TARP Quarterly Report, supra note 22, at 12. 
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failure to follow program standards, and unnecessary delays that harm 
borrowers while financially benefiting servicers.65 Despite these abuses, 
the Treasury has yet to penalize or restrict funding to a single servicer for 
any failure other than to provide data.66 According to the Office of the 
Special Inspector General for the Troubled Asset Relief Program, a 
congressionally created watchdog agency, the Treasury’s lack of 
enforcement stems from a fear of alienating servicers from participating in 
HAMP.67 The Treasury recently explained that because participation by 
the servicers is voluntary, “‘our abilities to enforce specific performance 
are extremely limited’ and ‘aggressive enforcement [is] difficult.’”68 
Despite calls by the Office of the Special Inspector General and other 
oversight bodies for the Treasury to get tough on servicers, the Treasury 
gives servicers vast discretion in the modification process and instead 
continues to devise new financial incentives for servicers to participate in 
HAMP.69 The Treasury has issued dozens of revisions (“supplemental 
directives”) to HAMP in an effort to encourage more loan modifications. 
Although these directives increased the rate of loan modifications, lenders 
granted only a total of 1,076,747 permanent modifications—as compared 
with the projected three to four million—while canceling 770,829 TPPs.70 
Thousands of other borrowers are in a state of limbo—making monthly 
payments in hope of attaining permanent loan modifications. The poor 
success rate, coupled with the high risk of re-default attributed to 
subprime loan modifications, indicates that HAMP has not met its 
objective of helping borrowers hold on to their homes. Unsurprisingly, 
borrowers have sought relief through the courts. 
A. Who Participates in HAMP? 
Initially, only servicers of loans that were owned or guaranteed by 
Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac were required to participate in HAMP; 
however, due to governmental pressure and incentives, most loan servicers 
currently participate in the program.71 Currently, over one hundred 
servicers participate in HAMP.72 To participate in HAMP, a servicer must 
execute a Servicer Participation Agreement with Fannie Mae, which acts 
 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. at 13 (alteration in original). 
 69. Id. 
 70. See August 2012 Performance Report, supra note 23, at 3. 
 71. See Chiles & Mitchell, supra note 16, at 195 (“Servicers of loans that are owned or guaranteed 
by Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac are required to participate in HAMP. For all other servicers, 
participation is voluntary. With monetary incentives and old fashioned arm-twisting, however, the 
Treasury Department has successfully coaxed many of these servicers to participate as well.”). 
 72. For a complete list of participating servicers, see Contact Your Mortgage Company, Making 
Home Affordable, http://www.makinghomeaffordable.gov/get-assistance/contact-mortgage/Pages/ 
default.aspx (last updated Aug. 4, 2011). 
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as a financial agent for the U.S. government.73 HAMP is an economic-
based incentive program that encourages servicers to modify mortgages 
for certain qualified borrowers. For example, prior to HAMP, a loan 
modification was estimated to cost a servicer around $500–$600 in 
processing costs.74 Through HAMP, a servicer may be paid up to $4600 in 
incentives over the course of three years for completing a permanent loan 
modification.75 HAMP also provides additional incentives to borrowers 
and investors, depending on certain criteria.76 
B. HAMP Eligibility Requirements 
To become eligible for HAMP, a borrower must meet certain “pre-
screen” criteria.77 The most significant criteria require that (1) the 
mortgage loan is a first lien mortgage loan that was originated on or before 
January 1, 2009; (2) the mortgage loan is secured by a one-to-four-unit 
property, one unit of which is the mortgagor’s principal residence; (3) the 
property securing the mortgage loan is not vacant or condemned; (4) the 
unpaid principal balance on the mortgage loan is less than $729,750 for a 
one-unit property, $934,200 for a two-unit property, $1,129,250 for a three-
unit property, or $1,403,400 for a four-unit property; and (5) the mortgage 
loan has not been previously modified under HAMP.78 Interestingly, most 
borrowers who apply to HAMP meet these criteria. According to the most 
 
 73. HAMP Supplemental Directive, supra note 6, at 1. 
 74. Joseph R. Mason, Mortgage Loan Modification: Promises and Pitfalls 7 (Oct. 3, 2007), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/so13/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1027470 (citing $500–$600 as the cost 
per loan modification). 
 75. A servicer may receive the following financial incentives for completing a permanent loan 
modification: (1) a “Completed Modification Incentive” in the amount of $1600, $1200, or $400, 
depending on the number of days the borrower is delinquent at the TPP Effective Date. For example, 
if the borrower is 120 or fewer days delinquent (150 days from Last Paid Installment (“LPI”)), the 
servicer will receive $1600. If the borrower is 121 to 210 days delinquent (151 to 240 days from LPI), 
the servicer will receive $1200. If the borrower is more than 210 days delinquent (more than 240 days 
from LPI), the servicer will receive $400; (2) an annual “Pay for Success” incentive in the amount of 
$1000 per year for a period of three years. The “pay for success” payment will be payable annually for 
each of the first three years after the anniversary of the month in which the TPP Effective Date 
occurred, as long as the loan is in good standing and has not been paid in full at the time the incentive 
is paid; (3) an annual “Pay for Performance” principal balance reduction. Certain borrowers whose 
monthly mortgage payment is reduced by 6% or more and who make timely monthly payments will 
earn this reduction equal to the lesser of $1000 ($83.33/month) or one-half of the reduction in the 
borrower’s annualized monthly payment for each month a timely payment is made. The payment will 
be payable annually for each of the first five years after the anniversary of the month in which the TPP 
Effective Date occurred, as long as the loan is in good standing and has not been paid in full at the 
time the incentive is paid. “This payment will be paid to the mortgage servicer to be applied first 
towards reducing the interest bearing UPB on the mortgage loan and then to any principal 
forbearance amount (if applicable).” See HAMP Servicer Handbook, supra note 17, at 123–25. 
 76. For a description of additional investor and borrower incentives, see id. at 125–28. 
 77. For a complete list of criteria, see HAMP Supplemental Directive, supra note 6, at 2. 
 78. Chiles & Mitchell, supra note 16, at 195. 
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recent HAMP records, 1,912,439 HAMP borrowers met these criteria and 
were offered a TPP.79 
Congress and the Treasury intended HAMP to be inclusive so that it 
could meet its target of modifying three to four million mortgages. 
Unfortunately, the most problematic area for borrowers occurs during an 
economic evaluation process after a TPP is initiated, but before a 
permanent loan modification is granted. As a result, of the 1,912,439 
HAMP applicants who were offered a TPP, only 1,076,747 were granted a 
permanent modification.80 
C. The Application Process 
The HAMP application process consists of several components. If a 
loan is two or more payments delinquent and meets each of the “pre-
screen” criteria listed above, the servicer should make a “reasonable 
effort” to “solicit” the borrower to complete a HAMP modification 
application.81 This process requires servicers to send borrowers an “initial 
package,” which is essentially a HAMP loan modification application.82 
Alternatively, if the borrower proactively contacts her servicer and 
requests a loan modification, the servicer should work with the borrower 
to determine whether she is at risk of imminent default and meets the 
HAMP criteria.83 If the borrower meets the initial package criteria, she 
will be offered a TPP.84 Finally, if the borrower makes all of the TPP 
payments, she should be offered a permanent loan modification.85 
1. The Initial Criteria 
The HAMP application consists of “initial package” documents. 
These documents include a Request for Modification Affidavit form,86 a 
 
 79. See August 2012 Performance Report, supra note 23, at 3. 
 80. Id. 
 81. See Chiles & Mitchell, supra note 16, at 195 (“A servicer is deemed to have made a 
‘Reasonable Effort’ to solicit a mortgagor under HAMP if over a period of thirty calendar days: 
(1) The servicer makes a minimum of four telephone calls to the mortgagor’s last known telephone 
numbers of record, at different times of the day; and (2) the servicer sends two written notices to the 
mortgagor’s last address of record, one letter via certified/express mail or via overnight delivery 
service with return receipt/delivery confirmation and one letter via regular mail. If the servicer has 
documented evidence that it satisfied this Reasonable Effort requirement without successfully 
communicating with the mortgagor, then continued solicitation is not necessary. Successful efforts by a 
servicer to communicate with a mortgagor are referred to as ‘Right Party Contacts’ under HAMP. If 
Right Party Contact is established and a mortgagor expresses an interest in HAMP, then the servicer 
must send a written communication to the mortgagor which contains and describes the documents a 
mortgagor is required to submit in order to be evaluated for a modification.”). 
 82. See infra notes 86–87 and accompanying text. 
83. HAMP Supplemental Directive, supra note 6, at 13. 
 84. See infra notes 86–88 and accompanying text. 
 85. See infra notes 100–104 and accompanying text. 
 86. See Chiles & Mitchell, supra note 16, at 195–96 (“The RMA is a standard form which seeks 
general information about the mortgagor, the mortgagor’s finances, and the property secured by the 
mortgage loan. Included in the RMA is a Hardship Affidavit. Every borrower seeking a modification, 
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copy of the borrower’s most recently filed federal income tax return, IRS 
Form 4506-T or 4506T-EZ, and copies of two recent pay stubs.87 Once 
this information is submitted, the servicer has thirty days to evaluate the 
borrower’s HAMP eligibility.88 
During the evaluation process, HAMP requires servicers to reduce 
the borrowers’ monthly mortgage payment to 31% of their monthly gross 
income.89 To achieve this, HAMP requires capitalization of accrued 
interest,90 interest rate reduction,91 loan term extension,92 and principal 
forbearance.93 Servicers are not required to reduce or set aside loan 
principal but have discretion to do so.94 Even if borrowers meet these 
criteria, they can be denied a modification based upon a net present 
value (“NPV”) test.95 The NPV test is a formula that determines whether 
it would be more profitable for servicers and the loan’s investors to 
approve a modification or to foreclose on the property.96 If the NPV 
result is higher for a modification than it is for a foreclosure, then the 
 
regardless of delinquency status, must sign a Hardship Affidavit attesting that he/she is unable to 
continue making full mortgage payments and describing one or more acceptable hardships as the 
reason therefore.”). 
 87. See HAMP Supplemental Directive, supra note 6, at 7 (listing financial form requirements). 
 88. See Chiles & Mitchell, supra note 16, at 196. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. (“[T]he servicer must capitalize accrued interest, out-of-pocket escrow advances to third 
parties, and any required advances that will be paid to third parties by the servicer. In addition, the 
servicer must capitalize servicing advances that are made for costs and expenses incurred in 
performing servicing obligations, such as those related to preservation and protection of the security 
property and the enforcement of the mortgage.”). 
 91. Id. (“If necessary, in the second step, the servicer must reduce the starting interest rate in 
increments of 0.125 percent to get as close as possible to the target monthly mortgage payment ratio. 
The interest rate floor under this step is 2.0 percent. If the mortgagor has an Adjustable Rate 
Mortgage (ARM) loan or interest-only mortgage, the existing interest rate will convert to a fixed 
interest rate, fully-amortizing loan.”). 
 92. Id. (“If necessary, in the third step, the servicer must extend the term and re-amortize the 
mortgage loan by up to 480 months from the Modification Effective Date, which is the due date for the 
first payment under the permanent modification.”). 
 93. Id. (“If necessary, in the fourth step, the servicer must provide for principal forbearance. The 
principal forbearance amount is non-interest bearing and non-amortizing. The principal forbearance 
amount will be fully due and payable in the form of a balloon payment upon the earliest of the 
mortgagor’s transfer of the mortgage property, payoff of the interest-bearing Unpaid Principal 
Balance (UPB), or at maturity of the mortgage loan.”). 
 94. HAMP Supplemental Directive, supra note 6, at 9 (“There is no requirement to forgive 
principal under the HMP. However, servicers may forgive principal to achieve the target monthly 
mortgage payment ratio on a standalone basis or before any step in the standard waterfall process set 
forth above. If principal is forgiven, subsequent steps in the standard waterfall may not be skipped. If 
principal is forgiven and the interest rate is not reduced, the existing rate will be fixed and treated as 
the modified rate for the purposes of the Interest Rate Cap.”). 
 95. Chiles & Mitchell, supra note 16, at 196. 
 96. Id. (“This NPV formula takes into account various foreclosure factors such as the current 
property value, foreclosure costs, and the expected resale time, and compares them with various 
modification factors such as the value of the modified monthly payment and the risk of a repeat 
default.”); see HAMP Supplemental Directive, supra note 6, at 4–5 (describing the NPV test); 
HAMP Servicer Handbook, supra note 17, at 102–03. 
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servicer “must approve the qualifying mortgagor’s modification as long 
as all other requirements are met.”97 However, if the NPV result is higher 
for a foreclosure than it is for a modification, then the servicer may deny 
modification.98 If the borrower does not meet all of the eligibility criteria, 
the servicer should explore alternatives to foreclosure prior to initiating 
foreclosure proceedings.99 
2. The Trial Period Plan (TPP) and Permanent Loan 
Modification 
If a borrower meets the initial criteria discussed above, the servicer 
will offer the borrower a TPP,100 where for three months the borrower 
must make monthly mortgage payments that are no greater than 31% of 
her gross monthly income.101 The TPP is initiated once a borrower pays the 
first month’s reduced mortgage payment.102 The borrower must then pay 
the remaining monthly TPP payments on time to remain eligible for a 
permanent modification.103 The HAMP guidelines provide that borrowers 
“who make all trial period payments timely and who satisfy all other trial 
period requirements will be offered permanent modification.”104 
Performance statistics indicate that this process is problematic. Of the 
1,912,439 offered TPPs, over 770,000 were canceled and never became 
permanent modifications.105 Servicers often claim that cancellations are 
due to insufficient income or documentation on the part of the borrower, 
while borrowers contend that servicers claim to lose their paperwork and 
make misrepresentations.106 Consequently, many borrowers file breach of 
contract claims against their servicers to enforce the TPP agreements. 
 
 97. Chiles & Mitchell, supra note 16, at 196. 
 98. HAMP Supplemental Directive, supra note 6, at 4. 
 99. Id. at 18. 
 100. Id. The TPP could be longer if necessary to comply with applicable contractual obligations. Id. 
 101. Id. at 8, 17–18. 
 102. Chiles & Mitchell, supra note 16, at 196–97. 
 103. HAMP Supplemental Directive, supra note 6, at 17. 
 104. HAMP Servicer Handbook, supra note 17, at 106. 
 105. See August 2012 Performance Report, supra note 23, at 3. 
 106. See TARP Quarterly Report, supra note 22, at 12 (“One of the great frustrations with 
HAMP, as expressed by legislators, consumer advocates, oversight bodies, and even Treasury itself, 
has been the abysmal performance of loan servicers, which not only operate as the point of contact for 
distressed homeowners seeking to participate in the program but also administer the loans on behalf 
of investors. Anecdotal evidence of their failures has been well chronicled. From the repeated loss of 
borrower paperwork, to blatant failure to follow program standards, to unnecessary delays that 
severely harm borrowers while benefiting servicers themselves, stories of servicer negligence and 
misconduct are legion, and the servicers’ conflicts of interest in administering HAMP—they too often 
have financial interests that don’t align with those of either borrowers or investors—have been 
described both by SIGTARP and COP.”); see also Arthur Delaney, HAMP: Obama Administration 
Lets Banks out of Doghouse for Bad Mortgage Servicing, Huffington Post (Mar. 2, 2012, 4:24 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/03/02/hamp-mortgage-barackobama_n_1316873.html?ref=business& 
ir=Business (“The most common reason for cancellations is insufficient documentation, according to 
Treasury. But homeowners say the real problem is banks losing paperwork.”). 
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III.  The TPP-Based Breach of Contract Theory 
Most district courts hold that HAMP does not afford a private right 
of action.107 Nonetheless, borrowers may be able to succeed by asserting 
common law claims on a TPP-based breach of contract theory. Under this 
theory, borrowers who had a TPP but did not receive a permanent loan 
modification argue that the TPP constitutes a formed contract between the 
borrower and the servicer. They contend that the servicer breached the 
contract by refusing to grant a permanent loan modification.108 Borrowers 
propose that the initial TPP solicitation is an offer, the borrower’s 
signature on the TPP contract indicates acceptance, and the trial 
payments and submission of other financial materials constitute 
consideration.109 The number of TPP-based breach of contract claims 
continues to grow, and courts are divided as to the validity of the legal 
theory.110 Most commonly, servicers are able to persuade courts that 
federal law either conflicts with or preempts state common law. To date, 
only one appellate decision—from the Seventh Circuit—has addressed 
this issue;111 as such, the dearth of controlling case law has led to 
inconsistent decisions among lower courts as to the validity of the TPP-
based breach of contract theory. 
A. The VIDA Rationale: Breach of Contract Claims Require 
Independence from HAMP 
HAMP affords no private right of action, and courts are not in 
agreement on whether borrowers can assert common law claims to enforce 
HAMP provisions. In December 2010, a district court in Oregon rejected 
the TPP-based breach of contract theory in Vida v. OneWest Bank, 
F.S.B.112 The Vida court explained that state common law claims cannot be 
used to enforce federal program provisions.113 In Vida, a borrower argued 
that she formed a valid contract with her lender when her lender offered 
her a loan modification and she accepted the offer, entered a TPP, and 
performed all required conditions.114 The borrower argued that the lender 
 
 107. See cases cited supra note 27. 
 108. See, e.g., Picini v. Chase Home Fin. LLC, 854 F. Supp. 2d 266, 273 (E.D.N.Y. 2012) 
(“Specifically, Plaintiffs claim that Defendants breached the TPP by accepting Plaintiffs’ payments 
under the TPP and then failing to modify Plaintiffs’ loan.”); Bosque v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A, 762 F. 
Supp. 2d 342, 351–52 (D. Mass. 2011) (discussing the plaintiffs’ argument that the TPP is a formed 
contract and that the servicer breached it). 
 109. See, e.g., Picini, 854 F. Supp. 2d at 273 (holding that plaintiffs met the contract formation 
requirements); Bosque, 762 F. Supp. 2d at 351–52 (finding that plaintiffs met the offer, acceptance, and 
consideration requirements). 
 110. See supra notes 107–109. Compare cases discussed infra note 27 (dismissing the theory), with 
cases discussed infra note 112 (upholding the theory). 
 111. Wigod v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 673 F.3d 547 (7th Cir. 2012). 
 112. Civ. No. 10-987-AC, 2010 WL 5148473 (D. Or. Dec. 13, 2010). 
 113. Id. at *5. 
 114. Id. at *1. 
920 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 64:905 
breached the agreement by denying her a permanent modification and 
initiating foreclosure proceedings.115 Under the TPP agreement, the 
borrower agreed: “If I am in compliance with [the TPP] and my 
representations . . . continue to be true in all material respects, then the 
Lender will provide me with a Home Affordable Modification 
Agreement . . . that would amend and supplement (1) the Mortgage on the 
Property, and (2) the Note secured by the Mortgage.”116 
The lender moved to dismiss the case on the basis that the borrower 
could not bring a TPP-based breach of contract claim because HAMP 
does not provide a private cause of action and her claims were not 
independent of HAMP.117 The borrower responded that, although her 
claim was premised on representations made during the course of the 
HAMP approval process, it was “not premised on an entitlement arising 
under HAMP and, thus, [did] not depend on a private right of action 
arising under HAMP.”118 Instead, the borrower argued that the claim was 
based on the common law of contract.119 In other words, “representations 
made by [her servicer] . . . themselves amounted to an enforceable 
promise to modify her contract and refrain from initiating foreclosure.”120 
The Vida court, relying on several district court decisions in the Ninth 
Circuit,121 disagreed and held that the facts and allegations in the complaint 
were “premised chiefly on the terms and procedures set forth via HAMP 
and [were] not sufficiently independent to state a separate state law cause 
of action for breach of contract.”122 
Interestingly, the Vida court stated that servicers were not “wholly 
immunized for their conduct so long as the subject transaction is associated 
with HAMP.”123 This assertion implies that a common law breach of 
contract theory could succeed if it is properly pled as a separate cause of 
action. However, the Vida court did not articulate what is necessary to 
assert a contract claim that is sufficiently independent of HAMP. The 
implication of Vida is that borrowers are foreclosed from enforcing 
 
 115. Id. The borrower also asserted a fraud claim, alleging that she detrimentally relied on her 
servicer’s oral and verbal statements that her “modification was underway” and “that no foreclosure 
sale would take place.” Id. 
 116. Id. at *5. 
 117. Id. at *3. 
 118. Id. at *5. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. 
 121. The court cited several district courts in the Ninth Circuit that dismissed the TPP-based 
breach of contract theory, see id. at *3–4: Wright v. Bank of Am., N.A., No. CV 10-01723 JF (HRL), 
2010 WL 2889117 (N.D. Cal. July 22, 2010); Hoffman v. Bank of Am., N.A., No. C 10-2171 SI, 2010 
WL 2635773 (N.D. Cal. June 30, 2010); Manabat v. Sierra Pac. Mortg. Co., No. CV F 10-1018 LJO 
JLT, 2010 WL 2574161 (E.D. Cal. June 25, 2010); Marks v. Bank of Am., N.A., No. 03:10-cv-08039-
PHX-JAT, 2010 WL 2572988 (D. Ariz. June 22, 2010); Aleem v. Bank of Am., N.A., No. EDCV 09-
01812-VAP (RZx), 2010 WL 532330 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 9, 2010). 
 122. Vida, 2010 WL 5148473, at *5. 
 123. Id. 
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HAMP provisions if their claims are at all based on HAMP. Courts 
continue to agree with Vida and prevent borrowers from asserting TPP-
based breach of contract claims.124 
Vida raises a question: Why can’t a borrower assert a common law 
claim that relates to, or arises out of, HAMP or any other federal 
program? Does HAMP conflict with or preempt state law? While the 
court did not expressly rely on preemption principles, its dismissal of the 
suit for lack of standing implies that HAMP conflicts with or preempts 
state law. As the case law demonstrates, courts continue to wrestle with 
preemption principles in the HAMP context.125 While some courts follow 
Vida, other courts reject Vida and uphold TPP-based breach of contract 
claims.126 
B. Does HAMP Conflict with or Preempt State Law? 
Courts are reluctant to allow borrowers to assert breach of contract 
claims to enforce HAMP because of constitutional preemption concerns. 
The Supremacy Clause states that “the Laws of the United States . . . 
shall be the supreme Law of the Land.”127 Thus, “state laws that interfere 
with, or are contrary to the laws of Congress, made in pursuance of the 
constitution are invalid.”128 There are three forms of preemption: express 
preemption, field preemption, and conflict preemption. In all forms of 
preemption, it is presumed that federal law shall not supersede state law 
unless it is the “clear and manifest purpose of Congress.”129 This is 
referred to as the presumption against preemption.130 
Express preemption occurs when a federal statute expressly states 
that it intends to override state or local law.131 In such a case, the intent of 
Congress is explicit. Because there is no explicit statement of preemption 
in HAMP, no one argues that it expressly preempts state law. 
When Congress does not express its preemptive intent, two situations 
might exist that can imply congressional intent of preemption: (1) field 
 
 124. See, e.g., Parks v. BAC Home Loan Servicing, LP, 825 F. Supp. 2d 713 (E.D. Va. 2011); Senter 
v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 810 F. Supp. 2d 1339 (S.D. Fla. 2011); Cox v. Mortg. Elec. 
Registration Sys., Inc., 794 F. Supp. 2d 1060 (D. Minn. 2011); Wittkowski v. PNC Mortg., No. 11-1602, 
2011 WL 5838517 (D. Minn. 2011); Herold v. U.S. Bank, N.A., No. CV 11-08108-PCT-FJM, 2011 WL 
4072029 (D. Ariz. 2011). 
 125. See infra Part III.B–C. 
 126. See, e.g., Picini v. Chase Home Fin. LLC, 854 F. Supp 2d. 266 (E.D.N.Y. 2012); Fletcher v. 
OneWest Bank FSB, 798 F. Supp. 2d 925, 930–31 (N.D. Ill. 2011); Bosque v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 
762 F. Supp. 2d 342 (D. Mass. 2011); Darcy v. CitiFinancial, Inc., No. 1:10-cv-848, 2011 WL 3758805 
(W.D. Mich. Aug. 25, 2011); Belyea v. Litton Loan Servicing, LLP, No. 10-10931-DJC, 2011 WL 
2884964 (D. Mass. July 15, 2011). 
 127. U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2. 
 128. Wis. Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 604 (1991) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 129. Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 565 (2009). 
 130. Id. See generally Mary J. Davis, The “New” Presumption Against Preemption, 61 Hastings 
L.J. 1217 (2010) (discussing the presumption against preemption). 
 131. FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52, 56–57 (1990). 
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preemption and (2) conflict preemption.132 Field preemption exists “if 
federal law so thoroughly occupies a legislative field as to make reasonable 
the inference that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it.”133 
In several cases, servicers have argued that Congress or the Treasury 
intended to occupy the HAMP field by deciding not to afford borrowers 
with a private right of action—thereby displacing state common law 
suits.134 
Conflict preemption exists if it would be “impossible for a private 
party to comply with both state and federal requirements or where state 
law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full 
purposes and objectives of Congress.”135 Commentators argue that 
conflict preemption is problematic because it has the “potential to be 
broadly applied,” since interpreting federal and state objectives can be a 
subjective process.136 In Wigod, the Seventh Circuit rejected a conflict 
preemption argument in the HAMP context.137 
Some observers have advanced a new rule that would function as a 
“true default rule” that creates a presumption against preemption.138 Such 
a rule would automatically apply in the absence of clear and manifest 
congressional intent to preempt. This proposed rule is “less rigid” and 
“more forgiving in implied preemption cases,” giving breathing room to 
the definition of actual conflict while maintaining focus on articulated 
congressional objectives.139 While preemption law is well-defined in theory, 
courts are often inconsistent in applying preemption principles.140 
C. A Better Approach: Upholding TPP-Based Contract Claims 
Courts continue to wrestle with preemption concerns in the HAMP 
context. In February 2012, the Eastern District of New York rejected the 
Vida rationale in Picini v. Chase Home Financing LLC141 and did not find 
that HAMP preempts state law.142 The court could not identify a single rule 
that requires state common law claims to be wholly independent of federal 
 
 132. See Davis, supra note 130, at 1221. 
 133. Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 134. See, e.g., Wigod v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 673 F.3d 547, 576–77 (7th Cir. 2012); Bosque v. 
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 762 F. Supp. 2d 342, 350 (D. Mass. 2011). 
 135. Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280, 287 (1995) (emphasis added) (citations omitted) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
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law.143 In Picini, borrowers sued their servicer under several breach of 
contract theories.144 The plaintiffs argued that they made all of their TPP 
payments on time but were not offered a permanent modification because 
the servicer engaged in “deny and delay tactics.”145 Soon after, the 
defendant moved to dismiss the lawsuit using the Vida rationale, arguing 
that there is no private right of action under HAMP, that the claim was 
not sufficiently independent of HAMP, and that the plaintiffs’ claim was 
“simply a HAMP claim in disguise.”146 The Picini court considered the 
argument but did not find it persuasive. Instead, the court found that the 
defendant failed to identify a source of law that provides “where a state 
common law theory provides for liability for conduct that is also violative 
of federal law, a suit under state common law is prohibited so long as the 
federal law does not provide for a private right of action.”147 In denying 
the defendant’s motion to dismiss, the Picini court implied that HAMP 
would not preempt the TPP-based breach of contract theory.148 
Likewise, in Bosque v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.,149 the court suggested 
that the only justification for the Vida rationale would be federal 
preemption of state law.150 In Bosque, borrowers brought a TPP-based 
breach of contract claim against their servicer.151 Similarly, the defendant 
moved to dismiss the lawsuit on Vida grounds, arguing that the plaintiffs 
were trying to “use state law as an indirect means to enforce HAMP.”152 
The court noted that the defendant did not prove that HAMP preempted 
a state law claim,153 which implies that the only justification for the Vida 
rationale would be a federal preemption of state law. Ruling in favor of 
the plaintiffs, the court stated that the “fact that a TPP has a relationship 
to a federal statute and regulations does not require the dismissal of any 
state-law claims that arise under a TPP. Nor does the fact that the TPP is 
a form contract created by the government change that analysis.”154 The 
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Bosque court went on to note that if a “TPP is properly construed as a 
contract between the parties in this case, then plaintiffs have standing to 
bring suit in order to recover for any breach of that contract.”155 
Wigod v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.156 is the only appellate court 
decision that addresses the validity of the TPP-based breach of contract 
theory. In Wigod, the Seventh Circuit rejected a servicer’s preemption 
arguments and reversed the district court’s decision to dismiss a TPP-based 
breach of contract claim.157 There, a borrower executed a TPP with her 
servicer that stated in part, “If I am in compliance with this Loan Trial 
Period and my representations . . . continue to be true in all material 
respects, then the [servicer] will provide me with a . . . Loan Modification 
Agreement.”158 The borrower made all four monthly TPP payments on 
time but was, nonetheless, denied a permanent modification.159 The 
borrower brought a class action complaint against her servicer, alleging 
that the TPP was a formed contract between the parties and that the 
servicer breached the contract.160 The servicer moved to dismiss the suit, 
and the district court, citing Vida, held that HAMP does not afford a 
private right of action and that common law claims must be independent 
of HAMP.161 
On appeal, the servicer argued that, even though the common law 
claims were not expressly preempted, field preemption and conflict 
preemption precluded the plaintiff from bringing a common law claim.162 
The servicer made a field preemption argument that the Home Owners 
Loan Act (“HOLA”) occupies the relevant mortgage field.163 HOLA was 
enacted “to provide emergency relief from massive home loan defaults 
during the Great Depression.”164 It empowers the Office of Thrift 
Supervision (“OTS”) in the Treasury Department to authorize and 
regulate federal savings and loan associations and to preempt conflicting 
state law by its regulations.165 Indeed, in one of its regulations, the OTS 
declared that it “hereby occupies the entire field of lending regulation for 
federal savings associations.”166 The Wigod court noted, however, that a 
savings clause within the same regulation states that “tort, contract, and 
commercial laws are ‘not preempted to the extent that they only 
incidentally affect the lending operations of Federal savings associations or 
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are otherwise consistent with the purposes of paragraph (a) of this 
section.’”167 The Wigod court dismissed the servicer’s field preemption 
argument, stating that because “OTS ‘has no power to adjudicate disputes 
between [savings and loan associations] and their customers,’ and ‘HOLA 
creates no private right to sue to enforce the provisions of the statute or 
the OTS’s regulations,’” common law suits by “persons harmed by the 
wrongful act of savings and loan associations” are not preempted.168 The 
Wigod case demonstrates that neither HOLA, nor OTS regulations, 
occupy the relevant field in HAMP cases. 
In Wigod, the servicer also argued for conflict preemption.169 
Conflict preemption exists if it would be either impossible for a party to 
comply with both local and federal requirements or if local law stands as 
an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and 
objectives of Congress.170 The servicer conceded that it is possible for a 
party to comply with both state and federal law, but argued that common 
law “would ‘substantially interfere with [its] ability to service residential 
mortgage loans’ in accordance with HOLA and OTS regulations” and 
“would ‘frustrate Congressional objectives in enacting [the 2008 Act] . . . 
to stabilize the economy and provide a program to mitigate ‘avoidable’ 
foreclosures.’”171 The Wigod court rejected this argument, explaining that 
a breach of contract claim does not place additional duties or obstacles 
upon servicers in the HOLA context or in the HAMP context, but 
instead compliments those statutes by requiring servicers to honor 
agreements with borrowers.172 
It is unlikely that allowing borrowers to assert breach of contract 
claims would prevent servicers from servicing residential loans. From the 
borrowers’ perspective, contract law encourages servicers to enforce a TPP 
or a loan under HOLA; it does not conflict with their ability to service 
loans. Moreover, “a state cause of action that seeks to enforce a federal 
requirement does not impose a requirement that is different from, or in 
addition to, requirements under federal law.”173 This is particularly true in 
the context of a breach of contract claim—where the claim is premised 
on enforcing a formed TPP contract that was drafted by the servicer. The 
breach of contract claim does not obligate servicers to comply with 
additional, conflicting state laws, but merely acts as an enforcement 
mechanism to hold servicers accountable for their promises and formed 
TPP agreements. Coupled with HAMP’s poor success rate and complaints 
of servicer misconduct, courts should be inclined to afford borrowers 
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access to state-based remedies and allow TPP-based breach of contract 
claims to move forward. 
More importantly, TPP-based contract claims are consistent with 
congressional intent. The purpose of the Act that authorized HAMP was 
to “stabilize the economy and provide a program to mitigate ‘avoidable’ 
foreclosures.”174 Providing an enforcement mechanism aligns with 
congressional intent to modify loans and prevent foreclosures. While 
servicers may argue that they should have discretion to modify loans and 
not be obligated under contract law to modify loans for unqualified 
borrowers, whether the person qualifies for a loan should be a question of 
fact, not a question to be addressed at the pleading stage. The issue is 
whether a borrower may assert a TPP-based breach of contract claim and 
have such a claim survive the pleading stage. Courts should follow Wigod 
and answer in the affirmative. 
D. Looking to Other Federal Law and Programs by Analogy 
District courts should allow TPP-based breach of contract claims in 
the same way that courts allow plaintiffs to assert common law claims 
based on other federal laws and regulations. Such examples include 
HOLA and OTS regulations, as well as the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, 
and Rodenticide Act (“FIFRA”).175 These statutes are similar to HAMP in 
that they are comprehensive federal statutes that neither provide a right of 
action to injured parties nor expressly preempt state law.176 Nonetheless, 
courts allow plaintiffs to assert common law claims based on these statutes 
and regulations.177 
1.  Contract Claims Are Allowed Under HOLA and OTS 
HOLA and OTS regulations are examples of federal statutory 
schemes that can be enforced through state common law. In In re Ocwen 
Loan Servicing, LLC Mortgage Servicing Litigation, Judge Posner 
explained that, although HOLA gave OTS “exclusive authority to 
regulate the savings and loan industry . . . [by] prescribing certain terms 
in mortgages,”178 it did not grant the OTS power to “adjudicate disputes 
between [savings and loans associations] and their customers.”179 Further, 
HOLA did not create a “private right to sue to enforce provisions of the 
statute or the OTS’s regulations.”180 Judge Posner went on to explain that 
HOLA did not preempt common law remedies for people harmed by 
savings and loans associations because it “would be surprising for a 
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federal regulation to forbid the homeowner’s state to give the 
homeowner a defense based on the mortgagee’s breach of contract.”181 
This same reasoning should apply to the HAMP context: Courts should 
allow borrowers to bring breach of contract claims to enforce TPP 
agreements and avoid foreclosure. 
In Fletcher v. OneWest Bank, FSB,182 the Northern District of Illinois 
adopted the Ocwen reasoning in the HAMP context and allowed a 
borrower to assert a TPP-based breach of contract claim.183 Applying 
Ocwen by analogy, the Fletcher court stated that since OTS-based 
mortgages could be enforced by contract law, it would be “logical” that 
the TPP—which fits the definition of a contract—could provide a basis 
for a breach of contract suit “even if its terms are prescribed by the 
federal government.”184 In the HOLA and OTS context, Congress did not 
grant borrowers a private right of action185 and did not grant OTS the 
power to adjudicate claims between savings and loans associations.186 
Nonetheless, borrowers are allowed to assert HOLA- and OTS-related 
breach of contract claims in federal court.187 Likewise, HAMP does not 
afford a private right of action and does not offer any adjudicatory scheme 
for borrowers to bring suit.188 Accordingly, courts should be consistent and 
allow borrowers to assert TPP-based breach of contract claims. 
2. Common Law Claims Under the Federal Insecticide, 
Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA)189 
Plaintiffs may assert common law claims related to other federal 
statutes, including FIFRA.190 FIFRA provides for federal control over the 
distribution, sale, and use of pesticides.191 It requires that all pesticides used 
in the United States be registered (licensed) by the Environmental 
Protection Agency and be properly labeled so that they do not cause 
unreasonable harm to the environment.192 As in the HAMP context, 
FIFRA is a federal statute that does not afford plaintiffs a private right of 
action,193 yet the Supreme Court has held that it does not preempt or 
preclude plaintiffs from asserting common law claims to enforce its 
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provisions.194 In Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, a group of Texas peanut 
farmers alleged that a pesticide manufactured by the defendant severely 
damaged their crops, partly because the pesticide was mislabeled under 
FIFRA.195 The plaintiffs brought claims of strict product liability, 
negligence, fraud, breach of warranty, and violation of the Texas 
Deceptive Trade Practices Act—essentially arguing that the pesticide’s 
warning label violated of Texas common law.196 The district court granted 
summary judgment for the defendant on preemption grounds, citing 
7 U.S.C. § 136v(b), which provides that such “State shall not impose or 
continue in effect any requirements for labeling or packaging in addition 
to or different from those required under this subchapter.”197 
On review, the Supreme Court overturned the district court’s 
decision, ruling that § 136v(b) only preempts “state-law labeling and 
packaging requirements that are ‘in addition to or different from’ the 
labeling and packaging requirements under FIFRA.”198 The Bates Court 
held that plaintiffs’ common law claims were not preempted because 
they were “equivalent to, and fully consistent with, FIFRA’s misbranding 
provisions.”199 In other words, the common law claims did not provide for 
additional or different labeling requirements, but instead afforded 
plaintiffs with a method of enforcing FIFRA guidelines. The Court 
reasoned that, although FIFRA is a comprehensive regulatory statute 
that sets out labeling requirements, it “does not provide a federal remedy 
to [parties] who are injured as a result of a manufacturer’s violation of 
FIFRA’s labeling requirements, [and] nothing in [the statute] precludes 
States from providing such a remedy.”200 The Court also considered that 
the “long history of tort litigation against manufacturers of poisonous 
substances add[ed] force to the basic presumption against pre-
emption.”201 The Court added, “If Congress had intended to deprive 
injured parties of a long available form of compensation, it surely would 
have expressed that intent more clearly.”202 
Here, as in Bates, HAMP is a comprehensive program that does not 
provide a federal remedy. Moreover, there is no legislative intent that 
explicitly or implicitly calls for preemption of state common law claims. 
Considering the rich history of civil litigation in contract, banking, lending, 
and property disputes, it is unlikely that Congress and the Treasury meant 
to preempt state common law. Absent any statutory language or legislative 
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intent, courts should apply the presumption against preemption and 
uphold the TPP-based breach of contract theory. 
Critics of this Note may argue that common law claims are simply 
an attempt to enforce HAMP: Because Congress affords no private right 
of action, no right of action can exist under state law. However, this 
argument blends two principles into an unsupported rule. It is true that 
HAMP affords no private right of action: Had Congress and/or the 
Treasury intended to create a private right of action, it could have done so 
by drafting that language. But it is inconsistent to assume that, because 
Congress does not afford a federal remedy, borrowers are barred from 
asserting state law claims that relate to federal statutes or programs. This 
theory conflicts with several constitutional principles of preemption,203 
including the presumption against preemption. As demonstrated, Ocwen 
and Bates provide appropriate analogous examples of courts allowing 
plaintiffs to assert common law claims to enforce federal statutes and 
regulations that neither provide a right of action to injured parties nor 
preempt state law. Courts should be consistent, rely on these cases, and 
allow TPP-based breach of contract claims to enforce HAMP. 
IV.  Legislation 
Further legislation is necessary to help HAMP meet its objective of 
slowing the foreclosure crisis. HAMP has many shortfalls: It has failed to 
reach its objective of modifying three to four million loans, and the data 
indicate that a significant number of borrowers encounter problems at the 
TPP stage.204 HAMP’s shortfalls have led borrowers to seek relief through 
the courts.205 While some borrowers have turned to the courts to enforce 
HAMP provisions, Congress and/or the Treasury should pass legislation to 
address the inconsistencies of court decisions. 
The Treasury should start by amending the HAMP guidelines so that 
permanent loan modifications are optimal to the borrower. Currently, 
permanent loan modifications leave borrowers at risk for re-default 
because the loans are unstable—often containing an adjustable interest 
rate, not reducing loan principal, and including a future balloon 
payment.206 These very terms were included in the sub-prime loans that 
contributed to the foreclosure crisis. Loans that include such terms are 
unstable in that a borrower’s monthly mortgage payment amount may 
vary on a monthly basis. If Congress and the Treasury are serious about 
stabilizing the economy and the mortgage market, they should preclude 
servicers from drafting unstable loans. This process will reduce the risk of 
re-default and the possibility of another foreclosure crisis. 
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The Treasury should amend the HAMP guidelines so that servicers 
are held accountable to TPP agreements. The Treasury can do this by 
requiring servicers to grant permanent loan modifications to borrowers 
who make all of the TPP payments. If a servicer has a legitimate reason for 
not offering a permanent modification, it should have to explain the 
specific reason for denial in writing. Servicers should not be allowed to 
deny modifications for reasons such as missing documentation or 
incomplete applications and should instead be required to provide the 
borrower with an opportunity to respond to or amend any mistakes. This 
process will limit servicers to denying borrowers for strictly legitimate 
reasons. 
Furthermore, the government should take an active role in the 
modification process by providing oversight. Currently, the servicer and 
the borrower are involved in most of the HAMP modification process, 
with little intervention from the Treasury or other governmental agencies. 
Instead, the Treasury should serve as an intermediary to ensure that 
servicers only deny borrowers for legitimate reasons. If a borrower is 
denied a permanent modification, she should have the right to file a 
complaint and appeal to the Treasury or other governmental agency. 
While a complaint or appeal is pending, the Treasury should temporarily 
freeze the foreclosure process until a decision is reached. The Treasury 
should have the authority to overturn a servicer’s decision and require a 
servicer to grant a permanent modification if the borrower meets the 
required HAMP criteria and terms of the TPP. Such a process would 
better ensure that servicers make a good faith effort in following HAMP 
guidelines and would allow borrowers to challenge servicer decisions. 
The Treasury has contemplated creating an appellate process,207 but it 
has yet to implement such a process. An appellate process could be 
administered by the Treasury, governmental oversight agencies, or, 
perhaps, administrative law judges. The Treasury and Congress should 
consider all of these options and promptly implement a review process. 
In cases where the borrower refuses to respond to or amend her 
application, or if the financial information is indeed insufficient, the 
servicer could end the HAMP application process but be required to 
provide the borrower with other alternatives to foreclosure; servicers, for 
example, could direct borrowers to all other MHA programs.208 This 
approach is more consistent with the congressional intent of the Act—to 
stop foreclosures and stabilize the economy. 
The legislation should also seek to prevent judicial inconsistencies 
and circuit splits. It should afford litigants with a private right of action to 
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sue under HAMP. Alternatively, it could explicitly grant borrowers the 
right to bring breach of contract claims to enforce TPP agreements. Such 
rights offer borrowers an opportunity to challenge servicer misconduct 
and provide them with a remedy in the foreclosure process. Additionally, 
the legislation should clearly indicate that HAMP does not preempt 
common law claims or defenses. This legislation would buttress the 
Bosque, Picini, Wigod, and Fletcher decisions, which uphold the validity 
of TPP-based breach of contract claims and provide borrowers access to 
the courts. Critics may argue that enacting these policies would further 
limit the chances for borrowers to attain loan modifications by dissuading 
servicers from participating in HAMP, but Congress could solve that 
problem by making HAMP participation mandatory. Enacting this 
legislation would better ensure that HAMP meet its objective of slowing 
the foreclosure crisis, allow borrowers not only to avoid foreclosure, but 
also to access sustainable loans, encourage loan servicers to adequately 
follow HAMP guidelines, allow borrowers to appeal modification 
denials, and provide borrowers with a private right of action to sue under 
HAMP. 
Conclusion 
HAMP has not met its expected goal of modifying three to four 
million mortgages. This failure caused borrowers to seek relief through 
the judicial system in order to keep their homes. The TPP-based breach 
of contract theory provides borrowers with one possible strategy to avoid 
foreclosure and receive a loan modification. Unfortunately, courts are 
inconsistent in determining the validity of such claims. Courts that follow 
the Vida rationale continue to preclude borrowers from asserting 
common law claims to enforce HAMP. As this Note has demonstrated, 
this approach is unfounded. Courts should instead follow the Seventh 
Circuit’s approach in upholding the validity of TPP-based breach of 
contract claims in the same way that courts allow common law claims 
that arise out of HOLA, OTS regulations, and FIFRA. To avoid future 
conflicts, Congress and the Treasury should enact legislation that amends 
the HAMP application process, requires more governmental oversight, 
and affords borrowers with a private right of action under HAMP. 
 
